Climate Change and the Moral Agent examines the moral foundations of climate change and makes a case for collective action on climate change by appealing to moralized collective self-interest, collective ability to aid, and an expanded understanding of collective responsibility for harm.

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 5, Page 44-45, September–October 2022.

However far we are from either in practice, basic global and intergenerational justice, including climate change mitigation, are taken to be theoretically compatible. If population grows as predicted, this could cease to be the case. This paper asks whether that tragic legacy can now be averted without hard or even tragic choices on population policy. Current generations must navigate between: a high-stakes gamble on undeveloped technology; violating human rights; demanding unbearable sacrifices of the already badly off; institutional unfairness across adults; (...) institutional unfairness across children; failing to protect children’s basic interests; and threatening the autonomy of the family. We are not yet forced to choose between bequeathing a tragic choice and making one, by adopting basically unjust measures. However, even the remaining options present a morally hard choice. The fact we face it is yet another damning indictment on the combined actions and collective failures of the global elite. (shrink)

Having a child is one of the highest-carbon decisions made by affluent individuals. Does this uncomfortable fact mean they should limit biological family size? This salient question also forces attention to two key issues. One is just how demanding individual climate justice duties are. The other is the danger of ‘ivory tower’ reasoning by privileged philosophers. On some topics, it is imperative carefully to integrate philosophical discussion with sociological and psychological research. Assuming individual climate justice duties include cutting one's carbon (...) impact, the discussion goes as follows. Should affluent couples and individuals have no biological children, because of the carbon cost? Not unless emissions-cutting duties are extremely demanding, or we make dangerous, generalised socio-psychological assumptions. Is there any individual duty to consider carbon impact when determining family size? Yes, because individual emissions-cutting duties are more than trivially demanding. Should all duty-bearers ‘stop at’ some fixed maximum number of biological kids? Not unless that number is one and we are prepared to accept very demanding individual emissions-cutting duties and make problematic sociological assumptions. Finally, the article outlines three further individual duties following from the ‘uncomfortable fact’: to raise good climate citizens, become activists, and cut the family carbon footprint. (shrink)

Liberalism faces a tension between its commitment to minimal interference with individual liberty and the urgent need for strong collective action on global climate change. This paper attempts to resolve that tension. It does so on the one hand by defending an expanded model of collective moral responsibility, according to which a set of individuals can be responsible, qua ?putative group?, for harm resulting from the predictable aggregation of their individual acts. On the other, it defends a collectivized version of (...) the harm principle. The claim is that the collectivized principle pushes the burden of argument, against coercively enforced measures to curtail climate change and compensate its victims, onto the global elite collectively responsible for environmental harms. Some such potential arguments are briefly considered and rejected. (shrink)

This article argues that parents have a special, shared duty to organize for collective action on climate change mitigation and adaptation, but not for the reason one might assume. The apparently obvious reason is that climate change threatens life, health and community for the next generation, and parents have a special duty to their children to protect their basic human interests. This argument fails because many parents could protect their children from these central harms without taking more general action to (...) combat climate change, let alone to mitigate it. Instead, subtler reasons are advanced, drawing on children’s relational interests or on their interests as moral agents. It is argued that parents owe it to their children to combat climate change because of the indirect impact on current children of serious threats to their children and grandchildren, and of being required to live in a radically unjust world. It is further argued that parents may owe it directly to their more distant descendants to mitigate climate change because of the role current parents played in bringing them into the world. (shrink)

We claim that a moral obligation to take climate leadership by means of unilateral mitigation depends on the existence of a plausible follow-the-leader mechanism whereby unilateral mitigation by some increases the probability of sufficient mitigation by others to avert catastrophic climate impacts. By understanding these mechanisms, we can better articulate the obligation for climate leadership across various sectors, from government to individual actors, in the fight against climate change. [Open access].

The historical debate of scientific realism portrays a monumental sign of science-a way of critiquing philosophy. At first sight, this centrepiece of scientific realism could line up against the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic meta-induction because, by means of the no-miracles assumption, fundamental theories in science would be the fine manifestation of reality as well as are most likely to be the truth. Nonetheless, a means to an end of the pessimistic meta-induction arguably states the anti-realistic position-since scientific speculations are (...) not always plausible to be the ultimate truth vis-à-vis mature hypotheses of science in history. By and large, I have herein put forward a systemic meaning for realism: an inspection of unseen objects in the world, which are broken free from the human mind. However, I will demonstrate the no-miracles argument in the vicinity of realism, whilst the pessimistic meta-induction lies towards anti-realism. In the bargain, I will examine structural realism in response to this scientific dichotomy. Briefly, this research article is, apparently, bound-up with a very limited account of relevancies; ergo, it would be recommended to further research on this controversy. (shrink)

Human population growth, along with technological development and levels of consumption, is a key driver of our devastating impact on the environment. This must be acknowledged as a matter of urgency. Otherwise, we risk bequeathing future generations a tragic choice between introducing explicitly impermissible coercive population policies, becoming incapable of securing even basic human rights, and worsening climate change and other environmental damage. However, this chapter warns against approaching questions of population from too narrow an environmental ethics viewpoint. If this (...) debate is conducted in isolation from considerations of global justice, there is a real danger of advocating policies that are plausible on the surface but impermissible when assessed in terms of their implicit impact on individual human lives. (shrink)

Martha Nussbaum has expanded the capabilities approach to defend positive duties of justice to individuals who fall below Rawls’ standard for fully cooperating members of society, including sentient nonhuman animals. Building on this, David Schlosberg has defended the extension of capabilities justice not only to individual animals but also to entire species and ecosystems. This is an attractive vision: a happy marriage of social, environmental and ecological justice, which also respects the claims of individual animals. This paper asks whether it (...) is one that the capabilities approach can really deliver. Serious obstacles are highlighted. The potential for conflict between the capability-based entitlements of humans and those of nonhuman animals or ‘nature’ is noted, but it is argued that this does not constitute a decisive objection to the expanded capabilities approach. However, intra-nature conflicts are so widespread as to do so: the situation is outside the circumstances of justice as they are standardly understood. Schlosberg attempts to reconcile such conflicts by re-examining what it means to flourish as a sentient nonhuman animal. This fails, because of the distinction between flourishing as a species, which often requires predation, and flourishing as an individual, which is as frequently incompatible with it. Finally, the paper considers how a capabilities theorist might move beyond such conflicts, identifying two possible strategies (which are not themselves unproblematic) for reconciling the demands of humans, animals and ecosystems. (shrink)

Nutrition and hydration—including artificially delivered, or assisted, nutrition and hydration (ANH)—are typically considered ordinary or proportionate care in the Roman Catholic moral tradition. They are thus morally obligatory, except when the benefit to the patient does not justify the burden their administration places on the patient or when they no longer prolong life (e.g., in end-stage disease when death is imminent). A review of Church documents and the medical literature provides convincing evidence that there are cases in which ANH provides (...) little hope of benefit and may impose an excessive burden on the patient. This paper closely examines advanced dementia of the Alzheimer’s (DAT) type and shows how ANH can be properly considered extraordinary care and hence is not obligatory in patients with advanced DAT. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 8.2 (Summer 2008): 291–305. (shrink)

(1990). Uncertainty as a Technique of the Exercise of Power: An Approach to the Question of Transition. World Futures: Vol. 29, Transition in Eastern Europe, pp. 47-67.

There are two competing accounts for a theory for human action proposed by Catholic theologians working within the received moral tradition today: a hylomorphic account and an intentional account. In this article, the author compares each of the rival theories for its ability to explain both the structure and morality of the human acts surrounding the elective termina­tion of the pregnancy of a woman with pulmonary arterial hypertension. This scenario of PAH is a superb test case to compare the explanatory (...) power of the two rival action theories. The author’s analysis reveals that the hylomorphic account is the superior account, which can explain better not only the norma­tive conclusions of the Catholic moral tradition but also our lived experience as acting persons in a world governed by cause-and-effect relationships. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 : 503–518. (shrink)

The term “individuarian” describes a person who seeks leadership in service of his community—he is neither blatantly self-interested nor blindly communistic, but seeks to contribute positively to society. In _Individuarian Observations, _William J. Byron reflects on this concept and the place of individuarians in both the Catholic Church and an American society in the midst of crises and transitions. Byron’s sharp insights propose an alternative ethical model based on engaged social participants who are committed to advancing the common good in (...) these difficult times. (shrink)

The December 1927 issue of the SCHOOLMAN contained Father Lord's forceful statements contending that philosophers could do nothing more conducive to their scholastic success than give forth again the philosophy they had assimilated by writing it out. The present vivid story is proof that Father Lord himself had "practiced what he preaches," for he wrote it during his own philosophate career. It is through the kind permission of the Editor of America, that this article appears in our magazine.

This article explores reverse mission as practised by African Christians in Britain. The main research question is what crucial role does African identity play in African mission in Britain and how does that lead towards developing African British theology? It is argued that such a theology will help African Christians in Britain be affirmed in their cultural identity whilst at the same time reach beyond African communities in their mission engagement. African British theology is related to Black British theology in (...) that they both take the black experience seriously for theological reflection. However, African British theology is also distinct in that it seeks to understand African identity and mission in a postmodern multicultural British society. My research methods have been as an African Practical Theologian involving active participation as well participant observation. My approach has been interdisciplinary engaging the fields of practical theology, diaspora missiology, African theology and Black theology. (shrink)